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In the past two years, the idea that for-profit business corporations are entities 
with First Amendment political speech rights equal to those of natural citizens has been 
at the center of many heated political debates. The Supreme Court made this 
counterintuitive proposition a reality in the 2010 decision for Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (130 S. Ct. 876). In this decision, the Supreme Court granted for-
profit corporations the right to spend unlimited amounts of money from their general 
treasuries on independent expenditures for explicit broadcast advocacy for or against 
candidates for federal office. The Court argued that money spent on independent 
expenditures is protected under the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment and 
that corporations are legal persons entitled to the same speech protections as individual 
citizens. The Court did not draw any distinctions between different types of corporate 
entities and instead argued that both expressive organizations
1
 and utilitarian business 
corporations
2
 possess full First Amendment political speech protections.  The general 
sense of outrage over the Court’s ruling that corporations have the same speech 
protections as individuals has led to many calls for reform of campaign finance
3
. 
However, a systematic understanding of why for-profit corporations lack a sound basis 
                                                          
1
 An expressive organization is an association of individuals that engages in public or private speech 
activities. It may take a corporate form, but it is not essential that it do so.  
2
 A business corporation is incorporated under American state and federal laws for the primary purpose 
of selling goods and services. In this paper, I will specifically be dealing with corporations that are publicly 
traded on the stock market and are bound by fiduciary duty to maximize profits and increase 
shareholders’ return on investment. 
3
 I am specifically referring to the Occupy Wall Street demand for a new constitutional amendment that 
would mandate campaign finance reform and would expressly state that corporations are not people. The 
document may be found at http://occupywallst.org/forum/detailed-list-of-demands-overview-of-tactics-
for-d/ 
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for speech rights in legal theory has yet to emerge. Without this foundational work, any 
attempt at reform is unlikely to be successful. The Court uses three theories of 
corporate personhood (artificial entity theory, the aggregate entity theory and the 
natural entity theory) to justify the extension of speech rights to for-profit corporations, 
but it never fully develops a legal theory specifically for corporate speech. Such a theory 
would enable the Court to systematically apply a cohesive logic to the issues of 
corporate speech rights. Without a theory of corporate speech rights, the Court lacks a 
normative framework within which to situate their decisions.  
This paper will attempt to untangle the theoretical assumptions of corporate 
personhood that the Court uses to justify corporate speech rights. It will then show that 
none of the three major theories of corporate personhood the Court uses can be a 
legitimate basis for extending speech rights to for-profit corporations. The paper will 
also show that corporations are artificial legal entities that lack the expressive rights 
underlying the right to political speech. This paper will offer a theory of corporate 
speech rights that allows for different degrees of protection for political speech from 
various types of organizations. The paper will conclude by offering alternate solutions to 
the legal and theoretical problems originally presented by Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.  
Facts of the Case 
In 2008, Citizens United, a 501 (c)(3) non-profit corporation, wanted to release a 
film called Hillary: The Movie that was critical of Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the 
presidency. However, section 441b of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance 
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Reform Act (BCRA) prevented political speech by for-profit corporations in the thirty 
days before a general election. Hillary: The Movie violated Section 441b of BCRA 
because Citizens United accepted a small part of its funding from corporate sponsors 
and wanted to distribute the movie within thirty days of an election cycle.  Citizens 
United filed for injunction to avoid the implementation of the law on the grounds that 
the production of the movie was primarily funded by non-corporate sources. Citizens 
United was denied injunction and the Federal Election Commission was granted 
summary judgment. Citizens United appealed to the Second District Court, but the 
district court ruled the McCain Feingold law was constitutional because the Supreme 
Court had upheld it in the 2003 case FEC v. McConnell.  The Supreme Court overruled 
the applicable part of McConnell, as well as Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
on the grounds that the government does not have a clear and compelling interest in 
limiting independent corporate expenditures in relation to federal elections. The Court 
argued that independent corporate expenditures cannot cause quid pro quo corruption 
or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, which are the only justifiable rationales 
for limiting political speech because according to the Court, quid pro quo corruption is 
the only empirically provable form of corruption. As a consequence of the Citizens 
United decision, for-profit corporations may make unlimited independent expenditures 
with their general treasury funds.  
This Supreme Court decision is important because the imprecise language of the 
decision has made it applicable to most types of corporations (including business 
corporations) even though the facts of the case only involved an expressive 
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organization.  The Court drew no distinctions between for-profit corporations and 
nonprofit expressive organizations and extended key exceptions of the BCRA that 
allowed political speech by nonprofit organizations to for-profit business corporations. 
The idea that for-profit business corporations have the same rights to political speech as 
individuals lies at the heart of the contention over Citizens United v. FEC. The Court 
reached this decision by arguing that both non-profit expressive organizations and for-
profit business corporations have the same claim to First Amendment speech 
protection. However, American corporate law makes it clear that nonprofit corporations 
and for-profit business corporations are very different legal entities. Even if nonprofit 
expressive organizations have a strong claim to political speech rights, for-profit 
business corporations do not have the same justifications for claiming political speech 
rights.  
Corporations in American Law 
One of the main reasons the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC was 
overbroad was that the Court did not acknowledge that the term “corporation” covers a 
large variety of organizations that have different purposes and organizational structures. 
They used the term “corporation” as a catchall to talk about any legal entity that has 
been incorporated under American law.  Black's Law Dictionary defines a corporation as: 
 An association of shareholders (or even a single shareholder) created under law 
and regarded as an artificial person by courts, having a legal entity entirely 
separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it, with the capacity of 
continuous existence or succession, and having the capacity of such legal entity, 
of taking, holding and conveying property, suing and being sued, and exercising 
such other powers as may be conferred on it by law, just as a natural person may 
(203). 
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 While this definition is nominally correct and clearly identifies the qualities all 
corporations possess, it does not acknowledge that the purposes for which a 
corporation is created and the type of laws under which the corporation is created can 
determine the legal rights of the corporation. In essence, there are many different types 
of corporations, some of which may have stronger claims to political speech rights than 
others. The most noticeable dichotomy lies between for-profit business corporations
4
 
and nonprofit expressive organizations
5
. For-profit business corporations serve the 
limited economic purpose of increasing the return on shareholders’ investments. 
Expressive organizations are created for a non-economic purpose that is usually 
ideological. American law recognizes the importance of expressive organizations and 
grant tax-exempt status to organizations that can demonstrate that they are formed for 
ideological or community-welfare-oriented purposes. In some instances, expressive 
organizations may be created to increase the “volume” of individual political speech 
through collective action. Expressive organizations serve a necessary purpose in politics 
because they help individuals exercise their expressive rights.  
                                                          
4
 A for-profit corporation that is traded on the public market is created specifically to generate profit and 
is legally bound by fiduciary duty to do everything within its power to increase the return on investment 
for its shareholders. Fiduciary duty makes the for-profit business corporation a utilitarian organization 
that is simply a tool used to achieve a particular economic end. They lack a clear motivation for engaging 
in political speech, because influence over candidates elected to office is not necessary to achieve their 
legal purposes.  
5
 Although there are many different types of nonprofit organizations, this paper will focus on the 
organizations that are incorporated specifically for political speech-related purposes. In this case, an 
organization can be said to have speech rights because organizational speech rights serve to enhance the 
voices of the individual members within the incorporated association.  
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Most business corporations are incorporated under one of fifty state-specific 
business corporation acts. They must comply with the state’s requirements for business 
corporations and will choose to incorporate in a state with favorable legislative 
practices. However, all business corporations are incorporated for the purpose of 
making a profit. They are bound by fiduciary duty to do everything in their power to 
increase their shareholder’s return on investment. Any action taken that decreases the 
profit margin of a corporation violates the corporate charter and may lead to criminal 
charges (Ribstein 28). This means that all for-profit corporate speech products must be 
tailored to reflect the business motives of the company. They are not incorporated to 
promote the expressive abilities
6
 of the individuals associated with the corporation or to 
add to the marketplace of ideas. Corporate entities can only act because of their 
commercial incentive. This makes any for-profit corporate speech product utilitarian 
rather than expressive because it is motivated by the corporation’s eternal quest for 
profit rather than an interest in social welfare or in promoting the individual’s speech 
rights.  This calls into question the applicability of First Amendment political speech 
protection for for-profit corporations. As legal entities, business corporations lack a 
clear source for political speech rights under the First Amendment.  
 Nonprofit corporations have a similar state-specific process of incorporation, but 
federal laws play a much larger role in the governance of non-profit corporations 
(Tucker 13). After incorporating under the laws of one of the fifty states, non-profits file 
for tax-exempt status under section 501 (c) of the IRS tax code. The purposes the 
                                                          
6
 Expressive abilities can be thought of as containing the powers of thought  and speech that enable 
individuals to participate in electoral politics. 
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corporation is founded for determine which subsection of 501(c) is applicable. There are 
twenty-nine different types of 501(c) corporations, most of which are not incorporated 
to promote individual speech, to educate voters or to engage in political advocacy 
(Levinson 18). For the corporations that are created for purposes besides political 
activity, political speech rights may be unnecessary. However, some 501(c) corporations 
are created for political activity and need political speech rights to carry out the 
purposes for which they were incorporated. For example, 501(c)(3) corporations are 
corporations that are created to further educational, religious, charitable, literary or 
scientific purposes. They are tax-exempt and are prohibited from engaging in political 
activity as a “primary purpose.” However, with larger 501(c)(3) corporations, the 
vagueness of the threshold between “primary purposes” and other organizational 
activities allows them to donate millions of dollars without violating the law (Levinson 
20).   
 The loopholes in the IRS 501 (c)(3) codes allow Citizen United to engage in some 
political advocacy without losing its tax-exempt status. Citizens United is a 501(c)(3) 
corporation that was incorporated in 1988 to educate Americans about conservative 
issues and to, “assert American values of limited government, freedom of enterprise, 
strong families, and national sovereignty and security." To fulfill this mission, Citizens 
United undertakes various educational projects, including television advertising 
and feature-length documentaries (Citizens United website). According to the IRS, there 
is no problem with a 501(c)(3) producing and distributing political education materials 
as long as they are nonpartisan (IRS website). However, the Federal Election 
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Commission determined that Hillary: The Movie was clearly express advocacy against 
the election of Hillary Clinton to the presidency. Even if Citizens United had not violated 
section 441b of the BCRA by accepting funding from for-profit corporations, the 
documentary may have jeopardized the organization’s 501(c)(3) status. Although 
Citizens United is limited in the amount and types of advocacy it can undertake, it is still 
an expressive organization created for a particular ideological purpose. The fact that it is 
not commercially motivated provides it with a much stronger claim to political speech 
rights than a utilitarian business corporation could justify because it can justify its claims 
to speech rights by arguing that it promotes social welfare and individual engagement in 
the political process.  
 Other types of 501(c) organizations have an even stronger claim to political 
speech rights. For example, 501(c)(4) corporations, which are incorporated for the 
promotion of social welfare and are usually community advocacy groups
7
, are allowed 
to participate fully in political advocacy and lobbying (IRS website). Because these 
corporations are created specifically to amplify the voices of individuals within a 
particular community, the organization has a much stronger claim to political speech 
rights than even a 501(c)(3) corporation. This stronger organizational speech right is 
based on the fact that a 501(c)(4) is clearly an expressive organization created to 
facilitate the process of individual political speech and to further the development of 
individuals’ autonomy rights. The fact that the protection of political speech rights varies 
                                                          
7
 Citizens United is not a 501(c)(4) because it is a national organization interested in education regarding 
federal politics. In order for an organization to qualify as a 501(c)(4), it must be a local association of 
individuals that specifically deals with local social welfare and political  issues.   
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between different types of nonprofit corporations makes it clear that an organization’s 
political speech rights are closely linked to its stated goals and the role the corporation 
plays in promoting the autonomous expression of the individuals associated with the 
corporation.  
 In essence, this brief discussion of different types of corporations serves to 
demonstrate that it is not sufficient to say that all corporations are the same. The 
differences in structure, purpose and allowable activities demonstrate that varieties of 
corporate entity may have different claims to political speech rights. Even if 501(c) 
corporations have a claim to political speech, for-profit business corporations lack a 
clear right to political speech. Unlike 501(c) corporations, business corporations are not 
created to promote an ideological goal or social welfare. They are created to streamline 
selling goods and services and are motivated by fiduciary duty to always seek to 
increase profit margins. Because they are commercially motivated, all political activity 
will also be tied to the corporation’s economic goals rather than an ideological goal to 
promote social welfare or individual expression (Avi-Yonah 1030). By conflating the 
speech of nonprofit corporations like Citizens United with for-profit business 
corporations, the Supreme Court greatly overextended First Amendment speech 
protections to cover organizations that do not have a clear right to political speech. The 
Court’s inability to distinguish between different types of corporation originated in part 
from their reliance on a muddled use of three theories of corporate personhood. None 
of the theories of corporate personhood they used offer a clear way to distinguish 
between types of corporations with varying strengths of claims to political speech rights.  
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Theories of Corporate Personhood 
Over time, three major theories of corporate personhood have emerged in 
American jurisprudence. The artificial entity theory is the best established of the three 
theories in that the Court has used the theory consistently since 1819. It is based on the 
idea that a corporation is a legal fiction created for a particular purpose that is clearly 
outlined in the corporation’s charter. This theory is also known as the grant theory 
because any and all rights the corporation has are granted to the corporation by the 
government. The government has extended such privileges as limited liability, favorable 
tax treatment, perpetual life, the separation of ownership and control to corporations 
(Shiffrin 10). Corporate rights are essentially limited to those the government chooses to 
grant. Chief Justice John Marshall embraced this theory in the 1819 case Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward when he wrote, “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it” 
(Quoted in Sepinwall 60).  Artificial entity theory sees corporate rights as a completely 
different category of rights from individual rights because individual rights are not 
granted by the government and are instead a result of each individual’s autonomy. 
Autonomy rights are the rights that individuals have simply by virtue of their humanity. 
Because people need to engage in dialogue and debate with others in order to develop 
their sense of self and conception of the good, speech is commonly understood as part 
of an individual’s autonomy rights. Under this theory, corporate speech rights may be 
limited or revoked if they interfere with individuals’ autonomy rights because the 
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strength of the protection given to autonomy rights is maximal. Entities with weaker 
claims to speech rights such as corporations that are granted speech rights may not 
interfere with or impede individual speech rights.  
 If artificial entity theory is applied to the idea of corporate speech, the 
government has the right to limit corporate political speech just as it limits a multitude 
of potential corporate actions. With the exception of non-profit corporations formed 
explicitly to engage in political advocacy, political speech is not necessary for 
corporations to achieve their chartered purposes. The true impact of the Citizens United 
decision was that it gave for-profit business corporations the right to political speech. 
For a business corporation whose express purpose is to increase revenue and to serve 
the economic interests of its shareholders or investors, political speech is unnecessary 
for it to achieve its legal purposes. In fact, the money spent on corporate speech 
decreases revenue and therefore decreases the amount of money shareholders will 
receive as a dividend from their investments (Levinson 9)
8
. When seen in this light, 
corporations do not have a strong claim to political speech rights under the First 
Amendment. In fact, political speech may prevent them from fully carrying out their 
chartered purposes.  
Artificial entity theory was evident in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
(110 S. Ct. 1391) where the Court argued that the government’s interests in preventing 
                                                          
8
 At this point it is important to remember that I am solely talking about corporate advocacy in relation to 
federal elections for political office. Lobbying government officials or participating in issue advocacy are 
separate issues and have different legal arguments associated with them. However, in terms of corporate 
independent expenditures for or against a candidate for political office, I do not see a clear connection 
between corporate speech and the profit motive of for-profit corporations.  
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distortion and corruption justified limiting corporate expenditures in relation to a 
political election. The Court reasoned that the unique corporate legal structure allowed 
corporations to amass large amounts of wealth that would be an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace, where large corporate expenditures could drown out individual 
speakers. This idea became known as the anti-distortion rationale and granted the 
government the power to limit the speech rights of corporations in order to allow 
citizens to be heard.  In essence, the Court argued that because corporations are 
created by the state, the state could limit their activities without violating the First 
Amendment. Austin is the clearest example of artificial entity theory in recent case law, 
but the idea that a corporation is a legal fiction created by the government is well 
entrenched in American jurisprudence. The Court in Citizens United v. FEC rejected the 
Austin decision in its entirety.  
The Court refused to accept the anti-distortion rationale in Citizens United 
because the logic of the artificial entity theory could be used to limit the speech of 
wealthy individuals, which would obviously be an infringement of First Amendment 
rights. Essentially, the artificial entity theory creates a regulatory scheme that is 
overbroad. The Court pointed out that wealthy individuals could also use economic 
resources to drown out the speech of other less wealthy individuals. The idea that the 
government could limit speech in order to protect the speech rights of another speaker 
who is entitled to the same degree of speech protection is antithetical to First 
Amendment jurisprudence. The artificial entity theory does not articulate a way to 
differentiate between corporate speech rights and individual speech rights. The Citizens 
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United Court argued that the Austin Court had ignored or failed to realize the 
implications of the anti-distortion rationale and that the rationale could not be allowed 
to stand. Under the logic of the anti-distortion rational, if the government has the right 
to limit corporate speech because of the potential for distortion of the political 
marketplace, it will also have the power to limit individual speech if it threatens to 
distort the political speech market. This lack of differentiation between types of 
speakers makes the government incapable of protecting individual speech while also 
limiting corporate speech. Thus, the artificial entity theory is not a sound foundation for 
a theory of corporate rights because the arguments that it generates fail to create a 
framework for differentiating between speakers (individuals) that need maximal 
protection and speakers (for-profit corporations) that do not.  
Unlike the artificial entity theory, the aggregate entity theory imagines the 
corporation as a collection of individuals that have come together for a shared purpose 
(Batchis 28). In this theoretical model, the corporate form is simply a mechanism by 
which the incorporated individuals can achieve their joint purpose. Aggregate entity 
theory places the onus of responsibility for the corporation on the people who come 
together to form the corporation. It rejects the idea that corporations are the creation 
of the state and points to the fact that modern corporate law does not require that the 
state or federal governments grant each corporation a unique charter (Batchis 33). This 
distinction is important because it recognizes that artificial entity theory has historical 
roots in a time period where each individual corporation was granted a charter of 
incorporation. In modern law, corporations do not have to petition the state legislature 
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for permission to incorporate. The absence of a direct grant of rights from the 
government to a specific corporation provides a challenge to artificial entity theory. For 
proponents of aggregate entity theory, corporations are independent of the laws and 
the government of the state and are the legal identities of the collectivities they 
represent. Under this theory, the corporation has rights derived from the rights of its 
shareholders and has a right to political speech as the collective identity of the 
shareholders. In the majority of case law and scholarly articles, the aggregate entity 
theory is reserved for small non-profit organizations that are organized for purposes 
that are important to the self-development of the members like community advocacy 
groups, charity groups or fraternal organizations. The aggregate entity theory would 
apply to both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) corporations because 501(c)(3) corporations are 
recognized as charitable organizations and 501(c)(4) corporations are community 
advocacy groups.  Before Citizens United, this theory was never applied to large for-
profit business corporations (Batchis 34).  
The majority opinion of Citizens United v. FEC relies heavily on the idea that for-
profit business corporations are associations of individuals that have expressive rights 
derived from those of their members. Justice Kennedy refers to corporations as 
“associations of citizens” throughout the majority opinion (130 S. Ct. 876 pg. 33-38). 
However, for-profit business corporations are not “association of citizens.” At least in 
the context of publicly traded corporations, corporations are legally bound to further 
the economic interest of their shareholders. In legal contexts, the rights and interests 
that shareholders legally have are not the same set of rights that citizens have in a 
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political context. Shareholders are constrained to a limited set of economic interests 
related to the proper management of the corporation and increased returns on their 
investment (Batchis 42). Calling for-profit corporations “associations of citizens” 
misconstrues the legal reality of the for-profit corporate entity and conflates expressive 
and for-profit corporations.  
 Justice Kennedy’s argument is flawed because for-profit corporations are 
inherently different from non-profit organizations and from individual citizens. Business 
corporations are not “associations of individuals” in the same way that non-profit 
organizations are. The aggregate entity theory should not be applied to for-profit 
corporations because they are designed to streamline the process of making and selling 
goods and services, not to enhance social welfare or promote individual autonomy. If a 
business corporation is publicly traded or has shareholders, it is legally bound to do 
everything it can to increase the profits of its shareholders or investors (Tucker 11). Any 
action it takes beyond the scope of this charge is a breach of fiduciary duty. Also, for-
profit corporations cannot derive expressive rights from their shareholders because a 
shareholder is also a legally defined interest separate from that of the actual individual 
(Tucker 13). The legal identity of a shareholder does not have the same autonomy rights 
that an individual citizen has because the shareholder’s only legal interest is in receiving 
the highest possible return on his investment. Thus, the characterization of a 
corporation as a group of individuals who come together to engage in speech cannot 
and should not be applied to for-profit corporations. The Court’s use of aggregate entity 
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theory to justify the extension of speech rights to for-profit corporations is a 
misapplication of the theory and cannot stand up to careful scrutiny.  
The third theory of corporate rights is the natural entity theory. This theory 
argues that corporations are separate legal entities from both the government and their 
shareholders and that a corporation is “akin to a natural individual with inherent rights, 
such as freedom of speech…” (Sepinwall 45). Under this theory, corporate speech must 
be attributed to the corporate entity rather than the individuals in the corporation. 
Scholars point to the phenomenon of group decision-making as support for this theory. 
In many instances, the final decision a group makes will not be the preference of a single 
individual but will instead reflect an internal bargaining process so that the decision 
cannot accurately be attributed to any entity besides the group (Allison 203). In regard 
to speech rights, natural entity theory argues that corporate speech is also the result of 
a process of internal bargaining and that the final speech product must be attributed to 
the corporation because it is not the product of any one individual speaker and is 
instead only attributable to the group because in many instances the decision the group 
makes will not reflect the desires or preferred outcome of any single actor in the 
organization (Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons and Organizations 54). Proponents of natural 
entity theory argue that limiting corporate speech destroys unique speech acts and does 
irreparable damage to the marketplace of ideas (Briffault 38).  According to this theory, 
corporate speech cannot be limited because corporations possess expressive speech 
rights as part of their autonomy rights.  
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Although none of the opinions from Citizens United v. FEC explicitly call on 
natural entity theory, there are plenty of implicit uses of the theory’s logic in the 
decision. Most notably, in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argues that 
corporations, like individual speakers, have the right to engage in political speech 
because they “strive to establish worth, standing and respect for the speaker’s voice” 
(130 S. Ct. 876 pg. 24). This implies that all corporations, like individuals, engage in 
political speech due to an inherent autonomy right to free speech. The idea that 
corporations, like individuals, strive for worth, standing and respect through political 
speech
9
 is unique to the natural entity theory and implies that the corporation’s right to 
speak is distinct from the rights of the incorporated individuals. According to this 
argument, corporations in and of themselves have an autonomy right to political speech 
protections that is not grounded in a government grant of rights or in the rights of the 
members of the corporations. Kennedy is arguing that corporations have taken on 
enough of the legal characteristics of autonomous personhood to be guaranteed First 
Amendment speech protection. This new category of rights-bearing entity lacks a 
connection to reality. Corporations could not exist without either the people who 
created them or the laws that allow them to exist (Oritz 9). Unlike individuals, who have 
autonomy rights and can exist without either community or the legal structures of the 
state, corporations are entirely dependent on the incorporated individuals and the legal 
structures of the state. Thus, even though group decision-making processes make it 
                                                          
9
 The argument that corporations strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the corporation’s 
voice implies that corporations enter into the political sphere as a way to develop and exercise autonomy 
rights. However, the legal reality of a for-profit corporate entity makes it so that its speech must be 
motivated by a desire to make a profit if it is not to violate its fiduciary duty.  
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possible to attribute speech to corporations and the Court treats corporations as rights 
bearing entities, corporations’ lack of independence from either the legal infrastructure 
of the state or the groups of individuals who create them demonstrates that they are 
not natural entities and do not have the autonomy rights necessary to claim an active 
right to political speech.  
The use of these three theories of corporate personhood in the Citizens United 
decision clouded the judgment of the Court and led it to conclude that both non-profit 
expressive organizations and for-profit corporations have a right to political speech that 
cannot be restricted or prohibited by regulatory schemes like the BCRA. The Court did 
not see a distinction between for-profit corporations and non-profit expressive 
organizations. They argued that all corporations are “associations of citizens” that may 
attempt to use political speech as a way to establish “worth, standing, and respect for 
the speaker’s voice.” The blending of aggregate entity theory and natural entity theory 
coupled with the decision to disregard the artificial entity theory led to the overbroad 
and illogical decision to grant all corporations full political speech protection under the 
First Amendment.  
A Legal Theory of Corporate Speech Rights 
 In the Citizens United decision, all three of models of corporate personhood 
either fail to provide convincing bases for corporate rights or produce overbroad 
arguments used to limit individual speakers’ political speech. Attempting to use these 
three models of corporate personhood to understand corporate speech rights is likely to 
lead to an unclear metric for corporate speech protection. The best way to determine 
Gaughan 




the level of political speech protection various corporate entities should have is to look 
at the rights that entitle different types of speakers to speak and the relative strength of 
those rights. The three models of corporate personhood fail to be useful in the context 
of corporate speech because the models do not acknowledge that there are different 
sources for speech rights and that the source of the right to speak may affect the 
strength of that right. In the eyes of the Court, “the First Amendment is written in terms 
of speech, not speakers” (130 S. Ct. 876, J. Scalia concurring, 11). Here Scalia is arguing 
that the First Amendment does not allow speech restrictions based on the identity of 
the speaker because the text of the First Amendment only expressly forbids laws 
impinging the freedom of speech and says nothing about the rights of speakers. In 
Scalia’s view, this implies that all speakers have the same right to speak and that one 
source of speech may not be limited to protect the speech rights of another speaker. 
However, this argument assumes that all speakers have an equal right to political 
speech.
10
 Common sense and legal precedent point to the idea that different types of 
corporate entities possess varying strengths of the right to political speech. As the 
earlier discussion of corporate entities revealed, the purposes of a corporation and the 
laws under which it is created both play major roles in determining the level of speech 
protection due to the entity in question. In 1991, Meir Dan-Cohen examined the 
theoretical underpinnings of speech by different organizational speakers in his article 
“Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by 
                                                          
10
 To be clear, I am not trying to say that individuals can have different strengths of speech protections. In 
this framework, individuals have maximal speech protections as a result of their autonomy rights. The 
differentiation of levels of speech protection only applies to corporate entities and should not be applied 
to questions of individual’s speech rights.  
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Organizations.” He found that there are several different sources for the right to 
political speech and that each source of political speech rights has different strengths. 
Under this model, it is possible to grant speech rights to some organizational speakers 
without declaring that all organizations have speech rights. It is also possible to restrict 
organizational speech if it impedes upon the speech of a speaker with a stronger right to 
speak. Of all of the theoretical models of organizational speech rights available, Meir 
Dan-Cohen’s model is the only model to examine the source as well as the strength of 
political speech rights. His model provides a clear and comprehensive look at the 
constitutional implications of corporate political speech.  
 Dan-Cohen’s model begins with the idea that individuals possess an original 
autonomy right to political speech. He argues that political speech is part of the 
autonomy rights of the individual. For Dan-Cohen, an autonomy right is a right that the 
individual has and the government must protect in order for the individual to develop 
her own identity and voice. He argues that in American jurisprudence, the First 
Amendment was designed to protect the free speech autonomy right of individuals 
(Dan-Cohen 1233). It is important to understand that the autonomy rights of individuals 
are the strongest possible justification for free speech. An individual’s original speech 
right is a deontological right and cannot be limited or compromised in any way.  
 After setting this foundation for comparison, Dan-Cohen creates a framework for 
varying strengths of the right to political speech. He begins with the idea that while 
individual speakers have an original right to free speech, individual listeners also have a 
right to hear any and all available information. This right is crucial to their forming 
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independent and well-educated opinions. Dan-Cohen labels this right the “passive 
aspect of freedom of speech” (Dan-Cohen 1242). The right to unimpeded information is 
a right nearly as strong as the individual’s original right to free speech because access to 
information is crucial to the development of autonomy. The passive aspect of freedom 
of speech can be a strong justification for corporate speech rights if the corporate 
speech enriches the marketplace of ideas. Dan-Cohen continues his analysis with the 
idea of “derivative rights,” or rights for another individual or entity that are derived 
from an external source (Dan-Cohen 1248). The primary use he makes of this concept is 
the idea of a “passive derivative speech right” which is a speech right that allows 
organizations without active speech rights to engage in speech. A passive derivative 
speech right stems from the listener’s right to an unlimited flow of information. 
However, the free speech rights that are derived from the listener’s right to hear are not 
autonomy rights. Instead, they are utilitarian rights
11
 and are closely linked to the value 
of the information produced has for the listener. The fact that speech produced by an 
entity with a passive derivative speech right is utilitarian means that it may be limited or 
restricted without interfering with First Amendment constitutional rights because 
utilitarian rights are weaker, government-granted rights that are not automatically 
protected by the First Amendment (Dan-Cohen 1249). Thus, if the speech produced by 
an entity with a passive derivative speech right interferes with the speech of an 
individual with an original right to free speech or if the speech produced by entities with 
                                                          
11
 Utilitarian rights are a weaker class of rights that are used instrumentally to achieve a particular end. 
These rights are not part of an individual’s autonomy rights, but are instead granted to the entity in 
question so that it can achieve a socially desirable end (such as selling goods and services in the economic 
marketplace).  
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a passive derivative speech right does not add value to the pool of ideas available to 
listeners, there may be cause to limit the political speech of entities with passive 
derivative speech rights.  
Dan Cohen adds another layer to his model of speech rights by discussing the 
different types of entities created by American law and the sources of their rights to 
speech. Business corporations that are incorporated under the for-profit section of 
American tax law are utilitarian organizations designed to maximize profit for their 
owners and shareholders. Because business corporations are legally bound to maximize 
profits, their active speech rights are limited to the speech that allows corporations to 
achieve their commercial objectives. This provides justification for commercial speech, 
but it does not provide a basis for political speech
12
 (Dan-Cohen 1250). For that 
corporate entities must rely on the passive derivative right stemming from the 
individual’s right to hear all information. However, this right is not strong enough to 
prevent the government from limiting corporate speech that undermines or drowns out 
the political speech of individuals. Essentially, the fact that corporations are designed 
and incorporated for purposes other than political speech requires the corporate entity 
to rely only on passive derivative rights. In the calculus of rights, political speech based 
on passive derivative rights has less weight than speech that stems from an original right 
to speech. In the words of Dan-Cohen: 
 
 
                                                          
12
 In this context, political speech is limited to independent expenditures that advocate for or against the 
election of a candidate to a federal office. Issue advocacy and lobbying are not covered by the scope of 
Citizens United and are outside the scope of this paper.  
Gaughan 




A derivative right is instrumental, whereas an original autonomy right is 
not. Within the limits set by its scope and weight, an original autonomy 
right may not be compromised even for the sake of enhancing the 
enjoyment of a similar right in others—doing so would be an 
impermissible act of sacrificing one person for another. In contrast, the 
entire purpose of a derivative right is to safeguard or enhance the 
enjoyment of certain rights by others. A derivative right is therefore 
measured—as all instruments are—by its effectiveness. It can always be 
discarded in favor of better means to attain the same goals. (1246) 
 
Because the First Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting individual 
autonomy, which is realized through the right to free speech, for-profit corporate 
speech may be limited or restricted. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
the Court argues that limiting the speech of one speaker in order to protect the speech 
of another speaker is not permissible because all speech is guaranteed equal protection 
under the First Amendment. If Dan-Cohen’s model is applied, this idea will only apply to 
the speech of entities protected by the same type of right. Rather than arguing that all 
speech must be treated equally under the First Amendment and that for-profit 
corporations have the same type of free speech protection as non-profit expressive 
organizations or individuals, for-profit corporate speech may be treated differently from 
individual speech because for-profit corporate speech is utilitarian in nature while 
individual speech comes from an inherent autonomy right to self-expression.  
Although utilitarian organizations like for-profit corporations are limited to 
passive derivative speech rights, there are organizational entities that possess stronger 
rights to political speech. Dan-Cohen labels these organizations “expressive 
organizations” and describes them as “organizations established for the specific purpose 
of engaging in speech” (Dan-Cohen 1248). In American law, the clearest example of an 
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expressive organization that takes the corporate form is the 501(c)(4) corporation. 
Unlike business corporations, these entities are created so that individuals can exercise 
their speech rights in a group setting and increase the “volume” of their speech by 
speaking as part of a larger group. Because individuals join expressive organizations in 
order to exercise their speech rights, the expressive organization can be said to possess 
a right to free speech that stems from the autonomy right of the individual to engage in 
free speech. Dan-Cohen calls this right “an active derivative right” and argues that, 
“legal protection is extended to such organizations based on a concern for the individual 
members’ original expressive rights and on the recognition that such organizations aid 
the exercise of those individual expressive rights”
 
(Dan-Cohen 1248). This is a much 
stronger theoretical basis for speech because it is linked to the right of association that 
is implicit in the First Amendment. Individuals have a right to associate with each other 
and to speak as a collective. Organizations that are created to further individual speech 
objectives such as non-profit expressive corporations have a claim to speech rights 
under the aggregate entity theory. The speech of an expressive organization is 
protected as long as it is representative of the ideological positions or beliefs of the 
individuals who support the organization.  This delegation relationship justifies much 
stronger speech protections for an expressive organization as long as there is a clear link 
between the organizational speech and the expressive wishes of the incorporated 
individuals.  
The Court recognized the strength of the speech rights claims made by 
expressive organizations in the 1986 case Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts 
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Citizens for Life, Inc (479 U.S. 238). In that case, the Court granted a campaign finance 
law exception that allowed corporations to create separate segregated funds that could 
only accept donations from employees and shareholders. These political action 
committees (PACs) were allowed to make independent expenditures in relation to 
electoral campaigns as long as they did not accept any corporate contributions. Because 
the independent expenditures of the political action committees were backed by 
individual contributions (and monetary contributions count as protected speech), PACs 
were seen as having an active derivative right to political speech. This distinction of 
differing rights of speech depending on the purpose of the organization shows that the 
Court has used a calculus of rights in the past that was more complex than that used in 
the Citizens United decision. It is not enough to declare that all speech is granted equal 
protection under the First Amendment. In most instances, the motivations and identity 
of the speaker affect the source and strength of the speaker’s right to political speech.  
By failing to examine the different types of corporate entities, the Court conflated 
expressive and utilitarian corporations and drastically overextended the First 
Amendment by granting political speech protections to organizations without a 
theoretical justification for political speech.  
The Court’s attempt to use the artificial, aggregate and natural entity theories 
inevitably led to the idea that corporations are endowed with the same speech rights as 
individuals because those three theories are incapable of showing that corporate 
speech is fundamentally different from individual speech. This approach also failed 
because the models the Court used do not provide a framework for examining different 
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types of corporate identity. However, Dan-Cohen’s model provides a way to examine 
corporate speech rights in a way that accounts for the identity of the speaker and the 
source of the speaker’s right to speech. For-profit corporations are the least protected 
of all organizational speakers because they are organized for a narrow economic 
purpose that usually has little to do with electoral politics.  For-profit corporate speech 
is not the same as individual speech because for-profit corporations do not have the 
autonomy rights that would guarantee maximal constitutional speech protections. For-
profit corporations may have a right to political speech derived from the rights of the 
listeners, but this passive derivative right to speech is purely utilitarian and should not 
be extended the full scope of First Amendment speech protection. On the other hand, 
non-profit expressive organizations may have justifiable claims to some degree of 
political speech protection. If the Court had used a more nuanced approach to 
understand the political speech rights of for-profit corporations and non-profit 
expressive corporations, the massive confusion over corporate personhood could have 
been avoided.  
Suggestions for the Future 
 Even though the outcome of Citizens United v. FEC cannot be changed and the 
majority opinion has already become part of the case law that defines judicial 
precedent, it is still useful to examine courses the Court could have taken to avoid 
granting for-profit corporations First Amendment political speech protections. One of 
the easiest ways for the Court to do this would be to use Dan-Cohen’s model of 
organizational speech rights or a model similar to it. This approach would have allowed 
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the Court to preserve expressive organizations’ expressive speech rights without having 
to conclude that all corporations have First Amendment speech rights. This would be an 
improvement over the Court’s current identity-blind rationales because it would better 
allow the First Amendment to protect individual’s speech rights without granting 
political speech rights to entities that lack autonomy rights. Incorporating a dichotomy 
between expressive and utilitarian organizations would have allowed the Court to 
create a clear-cut rule tailored to the problems of organizational political speech. This 
purely theoretical approach lacks a connection to the question of electoral finance that 
lies at the heart of the case, but if the Court had started from a sounder theoretical 
basis it would have been able to shape campaign finance laws to fit the normative 
theoretical model that best reflected the true purpose of the political speech 
protections embodied in the First Amendment.  
 There are two simple ways the Court could have tied a more nuanced theory of 
corporate speech rights to the realities of electoral finance and to the facts of Citizens 
United v. FEC. The first would have been to reject the idea that all corporate spending 
counts as a specific speech act. Over time, the Court has established that money can 
count as a speech act because almost all speech acts require some sort of money. 
However, the Court has also recognized that not all monetary expenditures qualify as 
protected speech acts. In Buckley v. Valeo, one of the seminal cases of campaign finance 
law, the Court ruled that corporations had the right to independent expenditures, but 
lacked the right to donate unlimited sums of money directly to candidates. The Court 
reasoned that independent expenditures were explicit speech acts, but direct 
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contributions to a candidate only counted as “general support for the candidate” and 
were not entitled to speech protections. Thus, the Court has already recognized that 
money spent in connection with an election cycle is not always entitled to speech 
protection. The Court could extend this precedent in a slightly different direction. 
Because Citizens United’s corporate donors donated to the organization in general 
rather than to specifically fund Hillary: The Movie, the Court could have ruled that the 
corporate donations to Citizens United were not speech and did not implicate the 
speech rights of the for-profit corporate donors. The Court could have ruled on the 
merit of the film as the speech product of an expressive organization. Although the film 
would likely have still been allowed under this standard, this reimagining of the role of 
money in political speech cases would have provided a precedent for further 
clarification of the role of money in political speech.  
 The Court could also have avoided extending First Amendment political speech 
protections to for-profit corporations by creating a de minimis exemption for for-profit 
corporate donations to 501 (c)(3) organizations. The Court could have found that the 
funding Citizens United received from for-profit corporate sources was minimal and did 
not pose a threat to the integrity of the BCRA or electoral politics in general. The 
loophole the Court created would be a way to avoid the constitutional questions posed 
by Citizens United v. FEC and would have greatly reduced the importance of the case. 
Rather than ruling that for-profit corporations have the same right to political speech 
under the First Amendment as individuals, the Court could have simply ruled that the 
particular provision of the BCRA that forbade political speech by groups that accepted 
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for-profit corporate donations was overly stringent. This minor adjustment to campaign 
finance law could have addressed the merits and the facts of the case without 
addressing the question of corporate political speech under the First Amendment at all.  
Conclusion 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission extended First Amendment rights 
that should be reserved for individual citizens to for-profit corporations on the grounds 
that for-profit corporations have the same rights to speak as individual citizens. This is 
problematic because for-profit corporations are not individual citizens with autonomy 
rights that can only be fulfilled through political speech. They are artificial legal entities 
that are granted a separate identity under the law in order to facilitate their economic 
goals. The fact that the law grants non-profit corporate entities some political speech 
rights does not provide grounds for for-profit corporations to claim that they have the 
same theoretical justifications for speech. The three theories of corporate personhood 
all make a fatal assumption that “corporate personhood” grants corporations the same 
type of personhood rights individuals have and that all types of corporate entities have 
the same claim to political speech rights.  As Dan-Cohen’s model demonstrates, the right 
to free speech is complex and has many different sources and types of rights associated 
with it. Because for-profit corporations are utilitarian organizations created for an 
economic purpose rather than an expressive one, the autonomy rights possessed by 
individuals do not extend to for-profit corporations. On the other hand, non-profit 
expressive corporations may still have a strong claim to political speech rights.  The 
analysis of Citizens United ignored the complexities of free speech and equated 
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individual speech with corporate speech. The use of underdeveloped and unexamined 
theoretical justifications for speech led to a decision that violates the common sense 
and warps the First Amendment.  For-profit utilitarian corporations should not have the 
same First Amendment protections for political speech that individuals have. Until the 
Court recognizes that the right to political speech is more complex than the Citizens 
United decision made it seem, the First Amendment will continue to protect legal 
entities rather than American citizens. By using a nuanced and well-reasoned normative 
model of corporate speech rights, First Amendment political speech case law can be 
reclaimed and revitalized so as to best encourage genuine political debate amongst the 





















Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971. Print. 
 
Allman, M.J. "Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of 
the Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood." Florida State University Law 
Review. 38.2 (2011): 387-410. Print. 
 
Avi-Yonah, R.S. "Citizens United and the Corporate Form." Wisconsin Law Review. 
2010.4 (2010): 999-1047. Print. 
 
Batchis, Wayne. "Citizens United and the Paradox of Corporate Speech: From Freedom 
of Association to Freedom of the Association." New York University Review of Law & 
Social Change 36.5 (2012): n.pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 2 July 2012.  
<http ://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>.  
 
Berger, L L. "Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in 
Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation." Mercer Law Review. 58.3 
(2007): 949-990. Print. 
 
Briffault, Richard. "SYMPOSIUM: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL PROCESS: CORPORATIONS, 
CORRUPTION, AND COMPLEXITY: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED." Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 20.643 (2011): n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 2 July 
2012. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>.  
 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 130 S. Ct. 
 
Dan-Cohen, Meir. "Freedoms of Collective Speech: a Theory of Protected 
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State." California Law Review. 
79.5 (1991): 1229-1267. Print. 
 
Dan-Cohen, Meir. "Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Identity." The University of Chicago Law Review. 61.4 (1994): 1213-1243. Print. 
 
Dan-Cohen, Meir. Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic 
Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Print. 
 
"Exemption Requirements - Section 501(c)(3) Organizations." IRS. N.p., 30 Jan. 2012. 
Web. 21 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html>.  
Gaughan 




Garner, Bryan A, and Henry C. Black. Black's Law Dictionary. St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 
1999. Print. 
 
Hewitt, Hugh, James Bopp, Jared Haynie, Reza R. Dibadj, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Richard 
Esenberg, Ronald D. Rotunda, Ilya Shapiro, Nicholas Mosvick, Jason M. Shepard, 
Michelle R. Slack, Darryl R. Wold, and Kyle C. Worrell. Citizens Divided on Citizens United: 
Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment. Orange, CA: Chapman Univrsity 
School of Law, 2011. Print. 
 
Levinson, Jessica A. "We the Corporations? The Constitutionality of Limitations on 
Corporate Electoral Speech After Citizens United." University of San Francisco Law 




Ribstein, Larry E. "SYMPOSIUM: AN INTERSECTION OF LAWS: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE." Georgia State University Law 
Review 27 (2011): n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 2 July 2012. 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>.  
 
Schaeffer, Jarod L. "The Incorporation of Democracy: Justice Kennedy's Political 
Philosophy." Boston University Law Review 21 (2011): n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 
2 July 2012.  <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>.  
 
Sepinwall, Amy J. "Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate 
Citizenship." Connecticut Law Review 44.575 (2012): n. pag. LexisNexis Academic. Web. 
2 July 2012. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>. 
 
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. "Individual Autonomy and Fresh Speech: A Thinker Based 
Approach to Freedom of Speech." Constitutional Commentary 27.283 (2011): n. pag. 
LexisNexis Academic. Web. 2 July 2012. 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.ups.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>.  
 
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. "Methodology in Free Speech Theory." Virginia Law Review 




Sullivan, Kathleen M. "Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech." Harvard Law Review. 124.1 
(2010): 143. Print. 
 
Gaughan 




Toobin, Jeffrey. The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court. New York: 
Doubleday, 2007. Print 
 
Toobin, Jeffrey. "Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the 
Citizens United Decision." The New Yorker 21 May 2012: n. pag. Print.  
 
Tucker, Anne. "Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United." Case Western Reserve University Law Review 




"Who We Are." Citizens United. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Aug. 2012. 
<http://www.citizensunited.org/ who-we-are.aspx>.  
 
 
 
 
 
